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Introduction
Baruch or Benedictus Spinoza (1632–1677) is
one of the most admired Early Modern philoso-
phers. This may be because he is so extraordi-
narily bold, multifaceted, and rigorous. Bold:
Spinoza’s heterodoxic views are as numerous
as they are controversial. Among other things,
Spinoza denies divine purposefulness, free will,
the immortality of the soul, and miracles. Spinoza
is critical of monarchical government and con-
siders democracy to be the ideal regime. These
views are largely out-of-step with seventeenth-
century consensus views.Multifaceted: Spinoza’s
contributions to philosophy cut across metaphys-
ics, the philosophy of mind, epistemology, the
philosophy of action, the theory of emotions,
value theory and moral philosophy, political phi-
losophy, and the philosophy of religion. In an age
known for its ambition, Spinoza’s philosophical
reach is especially wide-ranging. Rigorous:
Spinoza’s philosophical sensibility is decidedly
informed by his approbation of the Euclidean
geometrical method as a model of deductive rea-
soning. Spinoza’s distinctive flair for careful and
systematized argument exhibits his hostility to
unexamined assumptions and allegedly common-
sensical intuitions.
Biography
Baruch Spinoza was born in 1632 in Amsterdam
to a family of Portuguese Jews. The Spinoza fam-
ily belonged to the Sephardic community that had
found asylum from the Spanish and Portuguese
Inquisitions in the newly independent United
Provinces. Spinoza’s upbringing consisted of tra-
ditional Jewish education in Hebrew and the
Torah in the community’s school. Following the
death of his father and older brother, by 1654
Spinoza is running the family business with his
younger brother. It is around the same time that
Spinoza frequents Franciscus van den Enden and
his Latin school. Van den Enden likely introduced
Spinoza to Cartesian philosophy.
Spinoza’s life is forever changed on July
27, 1656, when Amsterdam’s Jewish community
subjects Spinoza to a harsh act of communal and
religious chastisement, the infamous herem. This
writ of expulsion made Spinoza a persona non
grata among Jews. The text of the herem refers
without further specification to Spinoza’s “evil
opinions and acts” (más opinioins e obras), his
“abominable heresies” (horrendas heregias) and
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“monstrous deeds” (ynormes obras). There is
room for speculation as to the exact nature of
these “heresies” and “monstrous deeds” (Nadler
2002). Some suspect that Spinoza even wrote a
defense or apologia in Spanish, now lost (Curley
2015). Spinoza’s rupture from the community is
never repaired.
Sometime before 1661 Spinoza began but did
not finish two works: the Treatise on the Emenda-
tion of the Intellect and the so-called Short Trea-
tise on God, Man andHis Well-Being. He lives not
far from Leiden, in Rijnsburg, where he corre-
sponds with Collegiants and a broad network of
sympathetically minded thinkers including better
known figures such as Henry Oldenburg, then
Secretary of the Royal Society, and Christiaan
Huygens. Spinoza makes his living as a lens-
grinder. Later, while living in Voorburg, in 1665
Spinoza publishes the Principles of Cartesian
Philosophy. He is already at work on the Ethics
but interrupts its composition to begin work on the
Theological-Political Treatise.
The Theological-Political Treatise appeared in
1670 and provoked immediate condemnation by
religious and academic circles. Dutch secular
authorities complied, and the work was banned;
foreign authorities followed suite. In 1672 came
the Rampjaar, the invasion of the United Prov-
inces by the French. The ensuing collapse of the
De Witt government propelled the Orangist camp
and orthodox Calvinists to power. The De Witt
brothers themselves were murdered by a lynch
mob; Spinoza, uncharacteristically outraged and
wanting to confront the mob, was held back from
certain death by his landlord. Spinoza traveled to
the French garrison in Utrecht to meet the Prince
of Condé, though they failed to meet. He did,
however, spend time with a lieutenant-colonel,
Jean-Baptiste Stouppe, eager to meet a Dutch
intellectual celebrity (Nadler 2018a).
During his final years, spent mostly in the
Hague, Spinoza completes the Ethics, receives
Leibniz (whom he does not trust), declines a pro-
fessorship in Heidelberg, composes a Hebrew
grammar, and begins work on a second political
treatise, the Political Treatise, also unfinished at
the time of his death in 1677. Confidants Ludwig
Meyer, Jarig Jelles, and Jan Rieuwerts band
together to present much of his unfinished or
unpublished work to posterity, including the
Ethics. They publish the Opera posthuma in
1677, and soon after its Dutch translation, the
Nagelate schriften. With Jelles’ preface to the
Opera posthuma, the legend of the saintly philos-
opher from the Low Countries who in quiet nobil-
ity suffered the injustices of the intolerant is
already conceived.
Overview of the Ethics
Spinoza’s magnum opus, the Ethics, provides us
with the fullest exposition of his philosophy. Most
discussions of his philosophy begin or end in
accounting for the Ethics, so it is fitting to over-
view that here. Spinoza outright adopts the geo-
metrical method of Euclid; definitions, axioms,
scholia, this admirable and terrible “Dread-
nought” (Bergson 1938) of intellectual machinery
is called on to articulate a systematic view onGod,
humans, and the world. His goal is to “lead us by
the hand, as it were, to the knowledge of the
human mind and its highest blessedness” (2pr).
To accomplish this requires discussions of: “God”
(Part 1); “the nature and origin of the mind” (Part
2); “the origin and nature of the affects” (Part 3);
“human bondage, or the power of the affects”
(Part 4); and “the power of the intellect, or
human freedom” (Part 5).
Part 1 consists of two subsections. 1p1–p15
establishes that there is only one substance, God,
and that “whatever is, is in God” (1p15).
Spinoza’s substance monism puts before the
reader a problem in interpretation, viz., the prob-
lem of the attributes. Each attribute is conceptu-
ally independent (1p10), and there are infinitely
many attributes that belong to God (1p11). Many
readers ask how several attributes so conceived
can be held to constitute one substance. Should
not each attribute be held to constitute a substance
on its own, if each is conceptually independent?
Call this the unity objection. A classic response
provided by H. A. Wolfson is that attributes are
mind-dependent realities and that their plurality is
not grounded in substance itself (Wolfson 1934).
This would relieve the pressure raised by the unity
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objection; substantial unity remains unimpinged
by attribute diversity, as attribute diversity results
from the intellect’s conceiving each attribute
independently of every other attribute. However,
this comes at the cost of making substance
unintelligible. Attributes are the means by which
the mind comprehends substance’s essence (1d4).
If they are mind-dependent realities, mere subjec-
tive apprehensions of substance’s essence, then
the substance they qualify remains beyond the
intellect’s grasp. For this reason, this subjectivist
interpretation is considered largely unattractive at
present, but detractors have yet to settle the dis-
pute (Gueroult 1968). In 1p16–p36 Spinoza
moves to discussing God’s production of infi-
nitely many modes, or “that which is in another
through which it is also conceived” (1d6).
Spinoza’s conception of modes as “in” God is
the subject of another hot-button debate. One of
Spinoza’s early critics, Pierre Bayle, considers
that this position yields the abhorrent conclusion
that contrary properties can be predicated of God:
all modes inhere in God, or God is the ultimate
subject of predication of all modes, but modes
themselves have contrary properties, thus con-
trary properties can be predicated of God (Bayle
1740). There is little agreement whether Bayle is
right to interpret Spinoza’s substance-mode rela-
tion as one of inherence and predication (Curley
2019; Della Rocca 2008; Lin 2018; Melamed
2013; Schmaltz 2019). In the concluding appen-
dix to Part 1, Spinoza criticizes the prejudice that
sees God’s action as goal oriented. God, Spinoza
argues, cannot have an end for which it exists;
rather, God acts from the necessity of its nature
alone, and all else that exists follows from the
divine nature with a strict necessity (1p33).
Spinoza’s argument that belief in divine purpose-
fulness and the efficacy of prayer arises frommere
ignorance bears witness to his deep-seated anti-
anthropomorphism.
In Part 2, Spinoza begins with a discussion of
the metaphysical relation between the attributes of
Thought and Extension. As every attribute is con-
ceptually independent, no attribute can cause
inter-attribute effects. However, as each attribute
constitutes the essence of substance, all attributes
unfold according to the same sequence of causes
and effects. The underlying identity of causal
states and processes across attributes is character-
ized by Leibniz as the doctrine of “parallelism”
(Leibniz 1999, 25). The nomenclature stuck,
though it is not entirely accurate. Spinoza’s sug-
gestion that “the order and connection” of ideas
and things is identical across attributes does evoke
a kind of mirroring “in parallel” and one-to-one
pairing of modes of Thought to the modes of other
attributes (2p7). Hence, there is a causally isomor-
phic counterpart in the body for any idea in the
mind, just as there must be a causally isomorphic
counterpart in the mind for any bodily state,
although the mind and body cannot causally inter-
act (3p2). However, Spinoza additionally says
God’s power of thinking is equal to God’s power
of acting (2p7s). Yet not only are the attributes of
Extension and Thought kinds of powers of acting,
but so must every other attribute consist in a kind
of power of acting. This suggests that there is as
much going on in the attribute of Thought as there
is in every other attribute. Following the account
of attribute parallelism, Spinoza propounds a
short physical interlude and an account of the
human body and its complex corpuscular struc-
ture (2p13s et sq.) as a means of ascertaining the
“excellence of the mind” (2p13s). The assumption
here appears to be that knowledge of body is prior
to knowledge of mind. The body’s identity, claims
Spinoza, consists in a certain and precise ratio of
motion and rest; the mind is the idea of that ratio.
The small physics is followed by Spinoza’s theory
of knowledge. Spinoza sorts knowledge into three
kinds. The “first kind of knowledge” or imagina-
tion is mutilated and confused. It is knowledge of
the “common order of Nature” (2p30d) or from
random experience (2p40s2). It resembles opinion
and hearsay, as it consists only in the truncated
perceptions we have of our own bodily states and
of other bodies insofar as they causally interact
with the body and arouse such states. Such per-
ceptions fail to do explanatory work, Spinoza
thinks, for they present the mind with confused
representations of the body’s essence and external
bodies’ essences. This is the source of all falsity
and error (2p41). However, because bodies share
basic properties in common, the mind also has
access to a “second kind of knowledge.” This is
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reason stricto sensu and consists in the “common
notions” of Nature. Since whatever is fully present
as much in the whole of Nature as in any of its
parts cannot be inadequately perceived by the
mind (2p38), “common notions” constitute “nec-
essarily true” knowledge (2p41). However, we
still do not have knowledge of essences. For this,
there is the “third kind of knowledge” or scientia
intuitiva. Spinoza maintains that we can deduce
the idea of a singular thing’s essence “in one
glance” from an attribute’s formal essence
(2p42s). In conclusion to Part 2, Spinoza argues
that ideas possess inherently affirmatory natures
and are not mere mute “pictures” (2p48s). The
mind does not contemplate its ideas only then to
assent or reject them, pace Descartes. Rather, “the
will and the intellect are one and the same”
(2p49c) and representations command assent
because of their innate power, which varies in
proportion to their adequacy or veracity.
With Part 3, Spinoza turns to the domain of
metaphysical psychology and the theory of the
affects. No term is more connoted here than
conatus or “striving.” The striving to persevere
in being is said to characterize what anything does
by its own power (3p6). A thing’s nature consists
in an affirming of that nature and whatever effects
follows from that nature and a thing naturally
resists destruction by foreign incompatible
natures. Some hold that this doctrine suggests
that Spinoza is not utterly opposed to all teleolog-
ical explanations, as finite things, like human
beings, have goals or ends through which their
natures appear conceived (Carriero 2005; Garrett
2002). Take the body. On logical grounds, what-
ever excludes its ratio of motion and rest is not
contained in its definition or nature; the body
strives to persevere in its ratio of motion and rest
to the degree that it has sufficient power, causing
other effects to follow from it. We as human
beings desire, and call good, whatever agrees
with this striving to affirm our nature and are
averse to, and call evil, that which restrains it
(3p9s). Further, Spinoza maintains that a thing’s
activity consists in whatever follows from its
nature alone, its passivity consists in whatever
follows from its nature in conjunction with other
natures (3d2), while affects are the ideas of the
body’s states of activity or passivity (3d3). In sum,
for Spinoza, I don’t really have a conatus; rather,
I am a conatus, a striving. Consequently, in my
inevitable intercourse with the external world
through which I am partly conceived, I come to
experience affects. These indicate what I believe
are my successes (re: joy) or failures (re: sadness)
on the conatus front. Nonetheless, to the degree
that affects arise from external causes, they neither
constitute genuine actions nor genuine satisfac-
tions of my nature as a conatus. Finally, because
affects involve an element of belief, namely, the
belief that certain objects can cause certain joys or
sadness, affects can be rationally justified or not.
Additionally, they are open to cognitive therapy,
as beliefs can be challenged by the intellect. On
Spinoza’s view, there are three explanatorily basic
affects: joy, sadness, and desire (3p11s). Nonethe-
less, Spinoza seems to adduce an additional com-
plexifying mechanism at 3p27 when he states that
by nature humans imitate one another’s affects
(Moreau 2005).
It is only with Part 4 that Spinoza provides his
ethical theory, where the central intuition is that
reason can clarify what is ethical and guide us
accordingly. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether
Spinoza’s account can accommodate talk of
moral permissibility, obligations, blameworthi-
ness, and other characteristic intuitions of moral
thought. Consider the following. Spinoza adopts
an ostensibly normative ethical principle, ethical
egoism. Thus, the basic rational precept, what we
ought to do under the guidance of reason, is seek
what is useful (4p18s). His practical prescriptions,
the dictamen rationis (e.g., “the homo liber
always acts honestly, not deceptively” (4p72)),
are applications of this ethical egoist principle.
They show how reason does what is most useful,
namely, it corrects the imagination’s errors, coun-
ters the passions, and accommodates the striving
to be active and joyous. Reason is thus charged
with a therapeutic role as it can “remedy” the
affects (5pr). On reason’s instruction, we also
strive to form mutually beneficial friendships
with our fellow human beings (4app12); it is
because we are rational that we agree in nature
(4p35). Indeed, our greatest good, the knowledge
of God, is particularly good because no one
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person can monopolize it (4p36). (The reader
eager to master the recta vivendi ratio can turn
directly to the vade mecum provided as an Appen-
dix to Part 4.) So far, so good; however, there is a
sense in which, as seen above in 4p72, Spinoza’s
view may not be that reason prescribes ends or
that the dictamen rationis are normative proposi-
tions, but rather that, in all rigor, under the guid-
ance of reason we are determined to such and such
actions. The normative collapses into the descrip-
tive. It is not that I ought not to lie, but that if I am
rational, I do not lie. Elsewhere Spinoza seems to
question the worth of normative propositions alto-
gether, as they misapprehend specific natures. For
instance, in correspondence with the Calvinist
Willem van Blijenbergh, Spinoza disparages the
belief that someone depraved, such as Nero, can
really be held morally blameworthy, since in rela-
tion to such a nature, crimes like matricide consti-
tute virtue (Ep. 23). Such considerations have led
some notable commentators to maintain that
Spinoza’s ethics provides scant space for a con-
ception of morality and moral agency (Deleuze
1981).
Part 5, like Part 1, consists in two subsections.
5p1–p20s covers the remedies for the affects that
pertain to the mind’s duration and relation to the
body (5p20s). In brief, since we cannot control the
objects to which we attach ourselves, we must
control our evaluations themselves by means of
intellectual self-discipline, which involves con-
sidering all things as necessary. This amounts to
a erga Deum amor or “love toward God” (Nadler
2018b). In contrast, 5p21–p42s introduce
Spinoza’s discussion of the eternity of the mind
and the amor Dei intellectualis or “intellectual
love of God.” On Spinoza’s account, the mind
necessarily possesses an eternal part, constituted
by the understanding itself and to grasp this fact is
to experience a condition of intellectual love of
God. The views espoused here in the second half
of Part 5 have long puzzled, and enchanted,
Spinoza’s readers. How, it may be asked, can a
part of the mind remain after the destruction of the
body (5p23), if the mind just is the idea of the
body? Further, how is it that we can in this present
life do something with the body to increase the
part of the mind which is eternal (5p39s)? One
thing appears clear: Spinoza is not offering a
doctrine of personal immortality. The part of the
mind that remains is the understanding of the
eternal essence of the body and that
understanding does not overlap with most of
what characterizes our individual existences as
we experience them in duration. Spinoza attaches
supreme importance to this aspect of his thinking,
since it is in understanding the eternal part of the
mind and seeing all things sub specie aeternitatis
that we attain, on his view, genuine wisdom, true
peace of mind, and freedom. Alas, Spinoza con-
cludes, only so very few of us come to realize this
goal (5p42s).
Conclusion: Spinoza as a Political
Thinker
Though Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise
(the TTP) and his Political Treatise (the TP) have
received far less attention than they deserve, no
discussion of Spinoza is complete without an
account of his political philosophy.
As its subtitle indicates, the TTP’s central con-
tention is that “the freedom to philosophize” can-
not harm sovereign powers or states. Justifying
this claim involves showing that Scripture does
not purport to establish any theoretical or specu-
lative truths and that “the freedom to philoso-
phize” does not run counter to Scripture’s
commandments. To show this, Spinoza develops
a method of interpreting Scripture, namely, “that
our whole knowledge of it and of spiritual matters
must be sought from Scripture alone, and not from
those things we know by the natural light” (TTP
pr., §25; TTP ch. vii). Upon examination, Scrip-
ture intends uniquely to encourage obedience to
the cult of justice and loving-kindness. Prophets
do not possess theoretical knowledge and are
endowed only with moral certainty. Their goal
was to reach a wide audience and in consequence
they adopted their message to accommodate
superstitious views of God as powerful because
capable of extraordinary feats, hence the belief in
miracles (TTP ch. vi). Only with regard to the
content and meaning of the moral doctrine has
Scripture reached us uncorrupted (TTP ch. xv,
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§35–36). At root, Scriptural teaching is simple
and accessible to anyone regardless of intellectual
ability (TTP ch. xiii); the foundations of universal
faith, the so-called catholic credo minimum, are
the doctrines necessary to make us just and loving
and kind (TTP ch. xiv, §25–28). Commentators
have drawn attention to the credo minimum’s
peculiarities, as it does consist in views that are
patently anthropomorphic and superstitious and
thus at odds with Spinoza’s own philosophy
(Garber 2019; Matheron 1971). Consequently,
neither is philosophy the handmaid of theology
nor is theology the handmaid of philosophy (TTP
ch. xv). Having separated philosophy and theol-
ogy, Spinoza proceeds to bind politics and theol-
ogy to the benefit of the former. States which are
otherwise powerful collapse because of an
unresolved theological element in their mix.
Spinoza takes his cues from the history of the
ancient Hebrew Republic founded by Moses
(TTP ch. xvii–xviii). Priestly classes, desirous of
power, undermine the common good by monop-
olizing the administration of the rites and ceremo-
nies that are held to constitute religious affairs.
This undermines the common good because the
common people attach special value to these rites
and ceremonies and are willing to engage in dis-
sident political behavior or civil war in view
of securing the benefits they allegedly accrue.
Spinoza has not yet fully worked out what kind
of regimes are most powerful and why, a point to
which he returns in the TP; however, because
sovereign political powers are charged primarily
with administering this worldly interhuman
affairs, it already follows that the true message
of Scripture is in principle capable of being ful-
filled, if not superseded, by sovereign political
powers that can effectively see to it that multitudes
behave justly and with loving-kindness.
Sovereign political powers therefore see no detri-
ment in tolerating the “freedom to philosophize,”
but they do suffer internal division and rebellion
in attempting to stamp it out (TTP ch. xx).
The TP revisits several core commitments in
Spinoza’s political thinking. For one, Spinoza
develops the view that natural right just is power
(TTP ch. xvi; TP ch. ii, §4). Whether we are
driven by passions or reason, what we have the
power to do we have the right to do (TP ch. ii, §5).
However, because our power consists in reason,
and because reason cannot take root without
social support, it is a priori empowering to form
political and social units, or states. In fact, only
where there are common rules of law is natural
right even conceivable, as outside collective asso-
ciations we do not possess the power necessary to
secure our basic livelihood (TP ch. ii, §15).
Because in a state of nature we do not have any-
thing but an imaginary natural right, Spinoza
thinks we are therefore led spontaneously to
form what are essentially tacit social contracts.
Some readers stress the alleged difference
between the TP, with its emphasis on political
naturalism, and the TTP, where Spinoza’s explicit
contractualist view is more pronounced
(Matheron 1990). The right that defines the mul-
titude’s common power, and, hence, general wel-
fare is called the imperium, which is to say “state”
or “commonwealth” (TP ch. ii, §17)). Now, states
also strive to persevere in themselves and look to
increase their power. Here, as elsewhere, the most
successful striver will be the most rational, which
for a state consists in enjoying concord and tran-
quility (TP ch. iii, §10). Spinoza’s primary worry,
then, is to secure the conditions for long-lasting
peaceful alliances of natural right, where individ-
ual agents consent to the law, do no harm to the
general welfare, and thus see their own power
increased. The bulk of the TP is spent spelling
out the specifics of the ideal or model constitu-
tions for monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic
regimes. The aim is to maximize the amount of
rationality involved in each regime. Spinoza
reveals himself very preoccupied with the arith-
metic involved in careful institution design
(Ramond 2005). Fundamentally, a monarchy
will always be flawed, but a well-designed,
decentralized aristocracy can last forever (TP ch.
x, §9). Democracies are best of all, because the
power of the state consists in the power of all the
multitude that composes it (TP ch. xi). Regretta-
bly, Spinoza’s early death deprives us of a detailed
account of what this “absolute regime” should
look like.
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Cross-References
▶ Principle of Sufficient Reason
▶ Spinoza and the Sciences
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▶ Spinoza’s Metaphysics
▶Teleology in Early Modern Philosophy and
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▶Whole-Part Relations in Early Modern
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